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Abstract: In our work we adopt a structural perspective and apply an agent-based simulation approach 
to analyse knowledge diffusion processes in four structurally distinct networks. The aim of this paper 
is to gain an in-depth understanding of how network characteristics, such as path length, cliquishness 
and the distribution and asymmetry of degree centrality affect the knowledge distribution properties of 
the system. Our results show – in line with the results of Cowan and Jonard (2007) – that an 
asymmetric or skewed degree distribution actually can have a negative impact on a network’s 
knowledge diffusion performance in case of a barter trade knowledge diffusion process. Their key 
argument is that stars rapidly acquire so much knowledge that they interrupt the trading process at an 
early stage, which finally disconnects the network. However, our findings reveal that stars cannot be 
the sole explanation for negative effects on the diffusion properties of a network. In contrast, 
interestingly and quite surprisingly, our simulation results led to the conclusion that in particular very 
small, inadequately embedded agents can be a bottleneck for the efficient diffusion of knowledge 
throughout the networks. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a rich body of literature which clearly indicates that firm positioning in innovation 
networks (Powell et al. 1996), network dynamics (Powell et al. 2005) and the structural 
configuration of the entire system (Schilling and Phelps 2007) affect both the knowledge 
transfer processes among actors involved in the knowledge transfer process as well as 
innovation outcomes at the firm level. Nonetheless, we still have a rather incomplete 
understanding of how the network topology and its structural evolution affect the generation 
and diffusion of knowledge. One of the crucial questions for policy makers and managers in 
this context therefore is: how is the knowledge distributed across actors in the system and how 
can knowledge transfer be organized in efficiently? 
In this paper we apply a structural perspective on networks. When it comes to the relation 
between network structure and knowledge diffusion processes, we still face more questions 
than answers. Previous research indicates the formation and solidification of typical patterns 
such as core-periphery structures (Borgatti and Everett 1999), fat-tailed degree distributions 
(Barabási and Albert 1999) and small-world properties (Watts and Strogatz 1998). At the 
same time there is an ongoing debate in the literature about what an ‘optimal’ collaborative 
network structure should look like in order to foster fast and efficient diffusion of knowledge, 
thereby spurring collective innovation (Morone et al. 2007). While small-world properties – 
short path length and high cliquishness – are typically assumed to foster knowledge diffusion 
processes, there are also other large-scale network topologies (Mueller et al. 2014), which 
have significant effects on the diffusion properties of the entire system.  
The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, we conduct several simulation experiments 
to gain an in-depth understanding of how network characteristics, such as path length, 
cliquishness and the distribution of degree centrality, affect the knowledge distribution 
properties of the system. On the other hand, we study the interplay between these network 
characteristics to gain an in-depth understanding how mutually interdependent processes 
affect the diffusion of knowledge among the actors involved. To do so, we implement a barter 
trade knowledge diffusion process in our agent-based simulation model. With this model we 
analyse how the structural properties of four structurally different network topologies affect 
the overall knowledge diffusion properties within these networks. The rationale behind this 
approach is straightforward. The overall topology of a network is the result of individual 
cooperation decisions at the micro-level. We account for this fact by explicitly considering the 
structural network patterns, which can be traced back to very simple cooperation rules. By 
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using this approach, we focus on the diffusion processes of the system over time to identify 
the network structures and properties that ensure efficient knowledge diffusion on both the 
actor as well as on the aggregate level.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will give a brief overview of the literature on 
knowledge exchange processes in networks and network formation algorithms by placing a 
particular emphasis on barter trade processes. In Section 3, we conduct our simulation-based 
analysis of knowledge diffusion processes in networks. In doing so, we explore how 
characteristics such as path-length, cliquishness and degree distribution affect the 
performance of our networks. Additionally, we conduct a policy experiment to analyse the 
effect of different policy measures. The results are finally discussed in Section 4 together with 
some remarks on limitations and fruitful avenues for further research.  
2. Knowledge exchange and network formation mechanisms 
Modern economic growth is without doubt largely based on innovations and thus on the 
generation, acquisition and application of knowledge. Consequently, the term knowledge-
based economy became popular among economists as well as among politicians. Knowledge-
based economies are “directly based on the production, distribution and use of knowledge” 
(OECD 1996, p. 7). This triggered a growing interest in the role of knowledge generation and 
diffusion for economic growth. The conceptualization of knowledge as an ubiquitous public 
good that can be acquired for free is being replaced by a concept according to which a firm 
needs to be embedded in a network to absorb and make use of knowledge. This holds in 
particular for situations in which knowledge is exchanged informally.  
The following section will give a brief overview of the literature on knowledge exchange 
processes in networks (2.1) and on different network formation algorithms (2.2). This is 
followed by the presentation of the knowledge barter trade diffusion model, which is used for 
the simulation experiments (2.3).   
2.1 Informal knowledge exchange within networks 
In this paper we focus on informal knowledge exchange networks. In real life, informal 
networks are rather the rule than the exception. Nonetheless the broad majority of network 
studies are based on data from formalized cooperation agreements. The rationale behind this 
is straightforward: econometric network studies are dependent on reliable raw data sources 
(e.g. patent data) that allow replicating the cooperation behavior of a well-specified 
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population of actors. Irrespective of how good these raw data sources are, the informal 
dimension of cooperation is hardly reflected in this kind of data. Therefore, a lot of research 
still has to be done to further investigate informal knowledge exchange.  
Informal network structures can be found within industries but they also span between 
regional borders. They are even present between competing firms for barter trading 
knowledge (von Hippel 1987; Hicks 1995; Schrader 1991). This shows that ties in innovation 
networks not only reflect formal contracts but also informal relationships (Hanson and 
Krackhardt 1993; Pyka 1997). Moreover, informal ties are also important for formal 
contractual relationships because informal personal relations facilitate the transfer of 
information through more formal channels (von Hippel 1987). In 1991 Freeman (1991 p. 500) 
finds: “Although rarely measured systematically, informal networks appeared to be the most 
important.” Dahl and Pedersen (2004) find for the case of a cluster of wireless communication 
firms in Northern Denmark that especially informal contacts considerably accelerate 
knowledge diffusion. A particular type of informal network is observed by von Hippel (1987) 
as informal knowledge exchange among scientists and engineers working for different and 
even competing firms. “Informal know-how trading is the extensive exchange of proprietary 
know-how in informal networks of engineers in rival (and non-rival) firms” (von Hippel 
1987, p. 291). On the side of the giver, this deliberate transfer of information creates the 
expectation that he receives something back in return. Hence, informal knowledge exchange 
has the character of a barter exchange (Cowan and Jonard 2004).  
With our analysis, we follow Cowan and Jonard (2004) in modeling knowledge exchange 
between actors as a barter process and knowledge as an individual vector of different 
knowledge categories, which mirrors the concept of informal knowledge exchange. Actors in 
a network are linked to a small fixed number of other actors with whom they repeatedly 
exchange knowledge if trading is mutually beneficial for both actors. By this process of 
mutual giving and taking knowledge diffuses throughout the network until a steady state is 
achieved and the knowledge level of all actors stays constant. The interesting question is now: 
which network structure is most supportive for the diffusion performance on an individual but 
also on the aggregated level and why do certain structures perform better than others? 
We argue that the picture of diffusion processes we have thus far is not complete. A lot of 
research focused on small-world network properties and concluded that they speed up 
innovation or knowledge diffusion. Small-world networks are characterized by short average 
path-lengths with, at the same time, a high level of clustering. However, in this paper we are 
4 
 
able to show that these characteristics alone do not fully explain the knowledge diffusion 
performance of a network. By studying knowledge diffusion in four structurally different 
networks, we show that there has to be more to fully explain knowledge diffusion 
performance.  
2.2 Algorithms for the creation of networks  
In this section, we introduce the four structurally distinct networks analysed in our work. 
These are the Erdös-Rényi or random network, the Barabási-Albert network, the Watts-
Strogatz network and the Evolutionary network.  
The first models of complex network structures used Erdös’ and Rényi’s (1959) algorithm to 
transform a regular graph into a random graph. The attachment logic is quite simple; each 
node attracts ties with the same probability. This algorithm is not linked to considerations on 
the strategic behavior of agents and functions therefore it is used as a baseline model against 
which the other network topologies are compared.  
Another network that is analysed in our work is the Barabási-Albert network. In 1991, 
Barabási and Albert (1999) discovered a network characteristic in real-world networks (e.g. in 
scientific citation networks) that is not reflected in random graphs, namely that the probability 
P (k) that a node in the network is linked with k other nodes decreases according to a power 
law described by the following expression: 𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘)~𝑘𝑘−𝛾𝛾. The implication is that in large-scale 
networks a kind of self-organizing process leads to the emergence of a scale free structure. 
The explanation for this phenomenon is that real-world networks are typically characterized 
by growth and preferential attachment. The random graph model, in contrast, is described by 
the following rule: At the starting point we have n nodes and each pair is linked by the 
probability p. This leads to a Poisson distribution of the probability that a node has k ties.  
In 1998, Watts and Strogatz (1998) stress that biological, technical and social networks are 
typically neither fully regular nor fully random but exhibit a somewhat in between structure. 
They introduce an algorithm that transforms a regular network into this in between network 
structure by rewiring ties. The resulting networks have a high tendency for clustering, like a 
regular network, and at the same time small average paths lengths, like in a random graph. 
The long-range connections generated by this process decrease the distance between the 
nodes, leading to a small-world phenomenon. In these small-world structures, signal diffusion 
was found to be increased and as well as the speed of infectious diseases. The exact rewiring 
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procedure works as follows: The starting point is a ring lattice with n nodes and k links. In a 
second step, each link is rewired randomly with the probability p by altering the parameter p 
between p = 0 and p = 1, i.e. the network can be transformed from regularity to disorder. 
Consequently, the average number of connections remains stable but the algorithm creates 
variety in the individual connectedness. Watts and Strogatz (1998) point out that in their 
approach the dynamics of diffusion is an explicit function of structure, which is different from 
approaches that focus on specific topologies only such as stars or random graphs. According 
to Barabási and Albert (1999), in random and small-world networks, nodes with large 
connectivity (high k) are virtually nonexistent since this probability decreases exponentially 
with k. However, in real-world networks, the existence of highly connected nodes is very 
common leading to a power law tail. That is, in random network models the probability that 
two nodes are linked to each other is random and uniformly distributed, while Barabási and 
Albert (1999) found that in most real networks there is a preferential attachment mechanism 
in place.  
In 2014, Mueller, Buchmann and Kudic (2014) suggested an algorithm by directly deriving 
network formation theory from considerations of actor behavior. This algorithm is based on 
the assumption that actors are faced with a situation of information scarcity and accordingly 
adapt their behavior in selection cooperation partners for knowledge exchange. Hence, partner 
selections strategies are aimed at compensating the information deficit problem. It is 
suggested that the trade-off between the need for reliable information and the cost of the 
search process is reflected in a two-stage selection process in which firms randomly or based 
on the transitive closure principle pre-select a group of firms from which they make their final 
choice. The transitive closure mechanism works as follows (Holland and Leinhardt 1971; 
Davis 1970): When firms operate in an uncertain environment they may use existing 
connections in order to gain information about potential partners. For instance, if actor i 
cooperates with actor j and j also cooperates with a third actor k, then i may get information 
about the trustworthiness, reliability and value of the knowledge base of k from j. Whereas, it 
is much more difficult and costly to collect information about other firms that are more than 
two steps away or not connected at all. Consequently, the probability that i connects to k is 
higher than the probability to connect to more distant actors. Thus, network cohesion fosters 
knowledge sharing.  
Subsequently, the principle of (structural) homophily between firms and preferential 
attachment is applied as strategies for the final selection of a knowledge exchange partner. 
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Homophily refers to a preference for similarity between potential cooperation partners 
(McPherson et al. 2001). Two actors are assumed to be similar if they possess a similar 
structural position in a network, which reflects a similar status level. Consequently, highly 
attractive central actors prefer to connect to other central actors rather than to peripheral 
actors. Different from previous approaches, the model focuses directly on the actors and their 
strategic behavior and less on connecting probabilities as such. The applied algorithm leads to 
networks structures that are characterized by both small-world characteristics and a power-
law degree distribution. 
In the literature we already find contributions to the discussion on how network structure 
affects network performance in terms of knowledge diffusion. In the work of Cowan and 
Jonard (2007), knowledge diffusion performance is investigated in small-world and random 
networks. Cowan and Jonard (2004, 2007) show that in a small-world state structure, we have 
fast knowledge diffusion but high knowledge inequality. They show that there actually exists 
a positive relationship between small-world properties (local clustering and about 10% long 
distance links) and diffusion performance. However, the authors also state that path-length 
and cliquishness cannot be the sole explanation for network performance differences between 
different networks. They found that the asymmetry of the degree distribution is a decisive 
factor and, to be more concrete, that networks with a relatively asymmetric degree distribution 
perform worst. In their work, Cowan and Jonard (2007) identify trading stars, i.e. nodes with 
a relatively high number of direct linkages, while the direct partners have nearly no linkages 
among one another. According to the authors, these star nodes can significantly slow down 
knowledge diffusion processes. This is because stars can rapidly absorb the knowledge they 
are lacking (mainly due to their high level of connectedness) and hence stop trading relatively 
early. Thereby, they block many paths between actors that no longer function as channels of 
knowledge diffusion, which can even lead to a disconnected network (Cowan and Jonard 
2007). The authors use the existence of these stars as an explanation for why networks with 
highly asymmetric degree distribution perform worst (because there they have many stars). In 
contrast to Cowan and Jonard’s (2007) findings about the positive effect of small-world 
structures on network performance, Morone, Morone and Taylor (2007) find that random 
networks perform best in terms of knowledge diffusion, even compared with small-world 
networks. Morone and Taylor (2004) developed a model in which knowledge exchange is 
based on face-to-face interactions. Thereby it could be shown how small-world structures 
emerged. With regard to knowledge diffusion, the results could be an equal or rather unequal 
state depending on initial conditions. Knowledge exchange is modelled as a complex learning 
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process. Drawing on their earlier model, Morone, Morone and Taylor (2007) found that three 
factors determine the speed of knowledge diffusion in closed networks, namely the learning 
strategies, the networks architecture and the geographical distribution of actors as well as the 
initial knowledge level. Moreover, by analysing the influence of network size on knowledge 
diffusion they find that size is positively correlated with diffusion speed independent of a 
particular knowledge structure. In view of numerous factors that potentially influence 
diffusion processes, Morone, Morone and Taylor (2007) aim at making an attempt towards a 
clear taxonomy of all the factors that affect knowledge flows in social networks. 
2.3 The barter trade process 
In the literature there exists a great variety of diffusion models focusing on different aspects 
of knowledge exchange within networks. For our simulation model we use a barter trade 
diffusion model introduced by Cowan and Jonard (2004). We adapt the barter trade process of 
Cowan and Jonard (2004) as this process represents an informal knowledge exchange 
between actors in a network. This barter trade knowledge diffusion process is modelled as 
follows: 
In the model we start with a set of agents 𝐼𝐼 = {1, … ,𝑁𝑁}. Any pair of agents 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐼𝐼 with 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗 
can be either directly connected (indicated by the binary variable 𝜒𝜒(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) = 1) or directly 
unconnected (indicated by the binary variable 𝜒𝜒(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) = 0). An agent’s neighborhood 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 is 
defined as the set 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐼𝐼 with 𝜒𝜒(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) = 1, i.e. the set of all other agents in the network to 
which agent 𝑖𝑖 is directly connected. The network 𝐺𝐺(𝑛𝑛,𝑝𝑝) =  𝜒𝜒(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗);  𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐼𝐼 therefore is “the list 
of all pairwise relationships between agents” (Cowan and Jonard 2004, p. 1560). The distance 
𝑑𝑑(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) between two agents 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 is defined as the length of the shortest path connecting 
these agents, with a path in 𝐺𝐺(𝑛𝑛,𝑝𝑝) between 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 characterized as the set of pairwise 
relationships {(𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖1), … , ( 𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘, 𝑗𝑗)} for which 𝜒𝜒(𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖1) = ⋯ = 𝜒𝜒( 𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘, 𝑗𝑗) = 1. 
Every agent 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼 is endowed with a knowledge vector 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 = �𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐� with 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑙𝑙; 𝑐𝑐 =1, … ,𝐾𝐾. Knowledge is exchanged between agents in a barter exchange process. Agents follow 
simple behavioral rules in a sense that they trade knowledge if trading is mutually beneficial. 
An exchange therefore takes places if two agents are directly connected via a link and if both 
agents can receive unknown knowledge from the respective other agent, independent of the 
amount of knowledge they actually receive. This assumption allows us to incorporate the 
realistic idea that agents can only assess whether or not the potential partner has some relevant 
knowledge to share and not to a priori assess how much can be gained exactly from the 
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knowledge exchange. This is in line with the particularity of knowledge that its exact value 
can only be assessed after its consumption (if at all).  
In a more formal description, two conditions have to be fulfilled. Let 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 and assume there 
is a number of knowledge categories 𝑛𝑛(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) = #�𝑐𝑐: 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐 >  𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗,𝑐𝑐� in which agent 𝑖𝑖’s knowledge 
strictly dominates agent 𝑗𝑗’s knowledge. As we already know, agent 𝑗𝑗 will only be interested in 
a trade with agent 𝑖𝑖 if 𝑛𝑛(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) > 0 and vice versa. Hence, the barter exchange takes place and 
agents 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 exchange knowledge if and only if first, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖, and if second, 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛{𝑛𝑛(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗),𝑛𝑛(𝑗𝑗, 𝑖𝑖)} > 0. This is also called a “double coincidence of wants” (Cowan and 
Jonard 2004, p. 1562). If the ‘double coincidence of wants’ condition holds true, the agents 
exchange knowledge in as many categories of their knowledge vector as mutually beneficial. 
If the number of categories in which the agents strictly dominate each other is not equal 
among the trading agents (i.e. 𝑛𝑛(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) ≠  𝑛𝑛(𝑗𝑗, 𝑖𝑖)), the number of categories in which the agents 
exchange knowledge will be equal to 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛{𝑛𝑛(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗),𝑛𝑛(𝑗𝑗, 𝑖𝑖)}, while the decision in which 
categories the agents eventually exchange knowledge is randomly chosen with a uniform 
probability. Besides the particularity of knowledge named above, the model also incorporates 
the fact that the internalization of knowledge is difficult and the assimilation of knowledge is 
only partly possible due to the different absorptive capacities of the agents. This means that 
only a constant share of 𝛼𝛼 with 0 < 𝛼𝛼 < 1 can be actually assimilated by the receiver. 
Therefore, each period in time the knowledge stock of an agent can either increase to a before 
the exchange unknown amount (if an exchange takes place) or stay constant (if no exchange 
takes place).  
Agents in the model mutually learn from each other and by doing so knowledge diffuses 
through the network and the mean knowledge stock of all agents within the network ?̅?𝑣 =
∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼⁄  increases over time. As knowledge is considered to be non-rival in consumption, 
the knowledge stock in the economy can only increase or stay constant, but an agent will 
never lose knowledge by sharing it with other agents. Assume, for instance, that 𝑛𝑛(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) = 𝑛𝑛(𝑗𝑗, 𝑖𝑖) = 1 and that in category 𝑐𝑐1 agent 𝑗𝑗’s knowledge strictly dominates agent 𝑖𝑖’s 
knowledge and that in category 𝑐𝑐2 agent 𝑖𝑖’s knowledge strictly dominates agent 𝑗𝑗’s 
knowledge. In this situation agent 𝑖𝑖 will receive knowledge from agent 𝑗𝑗 in category 𝑐𝑐1 (with 
his knowledge in category 𝑐𝑐2 being unaffected) and agent 𝑗𝑗 will receive knowledge from 
agent 𝑖𝑖 in category 𝑐𝑐2 (with his knowledge in category 𝑐𝑐1 being unaffected). Therefore, after 
the trade the knowledge of agent 𝑖𝑖 changes according to 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐1(𝑡𝑡 + 1) =  𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐1(𝑡𝑡) +
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𝛼𝛼(𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗,𝑐𝑐1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐1(𝑡𝑡)) and the knowledge of agent 𝑗𝑗 changes according to 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗,𝑐𝑐2(𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗,𝑐𝑐2(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐2(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗,𝑐𝑐2(𝑡𝑡)). As agents exchange their knowledge as long as this trade is 
mutually advantageous, the barter trade process takes place until all trading possibilities are 
exhausted, i.e. “there are no further double coincidences of wants: 
∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼,∀𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖: 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛{𝑛𝑛(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗),𝑛𝑛(𝑗𝑗, 𝑖𝑖)} = 0” (Cowan and Jonard 2004, p. 1562).  
3. Numerical model analysis 
In this section we present the findings of our simulation analyzes where we explore how 
different network topologies affect the diffusion of knowledge. First, we address the 
relationship between network characteristics such as path-length and cliquishness and the 
network performance in terms of the average knowledge level of all actors. We then 
investigate how the asymmetry of the distribution of degrees affects network performance. In 
doing do, we first explain the model setup and the parameters used in the analysis. Then, we 
stepwise analyze the simulations’ outcomes to investigate the role of network structure for 
knowledge diffusion. Finally, we run policy experiments for each of the four networks to gain 
an in-depth understanding how policy interventions may affect our initially reported findings.  
3.1 Path length, cliquishness and network performance  
Before the first run, the model is initialized with a standard setting of parameters as follows: 
We assume a model population of 𝐼𝐼 = 100 agents connected by 200 links for all networks. 
The agents and links within the network are placed according to the algorithm described 
before which leads to the following four networks: (i) Random - Erdös / Renyi (n,M), (ii) 
Watts-Strogatz, (iii) Barabási-Albert and (iv) Evolutionary network algorithm. More 
precisely, we assume for the Watts-Strogatz algorithm a probability 𝑝𝑝 = 0.15 and for the 
Evolutionary network algorithm a preselection group of 5 and 100 time steps for the initiation 
of the network. Figure 1 illustrates the network patterns produced by these formation 
algorithms.  
Throughout each model run, every agent is equipped with a knowledge vector 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 with 10 
different knowledge categories drawn from a uniform distribution, i.e. 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐(0) ~ 𝑈𝑈[0,10]. For 
the agents’ absorptive capacities we assume a value of 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 10%. Finally we assume the 
knowledge levels of agents to be similar if the difference is not higher than 1%.  
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 Figure 1: Visualization of networks topologies created in NetLogo. From left to right: The Watts-Strogatz 
network, the random/ Erdös-Renyi network, the Barabási-Albert network and the Evolutionary Network 
Algorithm.  
In theory, it is often argued that average path-length and average cliquishness are the main 
forces influencing network performance. Figure 2 shows the average overall knowledge stock 
of all agents over time, i.e. the mean knowledge of agents within the network 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡� = ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼 /𝐼𝐼 of our four different networks obtained by 500 simulation runs for all network 
algorithms. Over time, the average knowledge stocks increase, however, there are significant 
differences between the four network topologies. In more detail, Watts-Strogatz networks 
perform best followed by random networks, networks created via the Barabási-Albert 
algorithm and the Evolutionary network algorithm. 
Following the idea that path length and cliquishness are the main factors influencing the 
diffusion of knowledge, we show both the average path length as well as the average 
cliquishness of the four groups of networks in Table 1. As pointed out by Cowan and Jonard 
(2004, p. 1564), a low path length as well as a high cliquishness favor network performance 
which is why small-world networks, showing both short path lengths and a high cliquishness 
are identified as networks fostering the diffusion of knowledge. This is what Cowan and 
Jonard call an ‘interior maximum’ (Cowan and Jonard 2004, p. 1569).  
Looking in more detail at the diffusion performance of the networks and the respective path 
length and cliquishness we see an increasing network performance for increasing path length 
of the networks. These results are inversely to our expectations derived by theory. In fact, the 
network with the lowest average path length is the network that performs worst in our 
analysis, namely the Evolutionary network. This leads to the idea that, in our context, not the 
average path length might be the decisive factor influencing network performance but the 
average cliquishness. Regarding the results of our simulation, however, this seems to only 
hold true for the Watts-Strogatz networks which show high cliquishness. The networks with 
the second best performance, the Random networks, have the lowest average cliquishness. 
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Moreover, even though the average path length of the Barabási-Albert and the Evolutionary 
networks are quite similar, the average cliquishness of the Evolutionary network is two times 
the average cliquishness of the Barabási-Albert networks and still the Barabási-Albert 
networks outperform the Evolutionary networks. So, the networks with the second highest 
average cliquishness are networks that perform worst.  
 
Figure 2: Average knowledge levels of agents in the respective networks over time over 500 simulation runs. 
  
Table 1: Average path length and cliquishness of all four network topologies over 500 simulation runs.  
These counter-intuitive results lead to the question whether a network’s path length and its 
cliquishness are fully able to explain the performance differences between the observed 
networks. Following the idea of Cowan and Jonard (2007), another network characteristic that 
could explain the differences in network performance is the distribution of links among 
agents. The authors found that, in a barter economy, the existence of ‘stars’ with a high degree 
centrality has a negative effect on network performance. According to the authors, this is the 
case as stars have so many partners that they acquire a high knowledge level in a very short 
time. This rapidly leads to a lack of double coincidences of wants which stops the knowledge 
trading process within the network which may even disconnect the whole network (Cowan 
and Jonard 2007, p. 108):  
“If the stars are traders, because they have many partners, they will rapidly acquire all the 
knowledge they need, and so stop trading. This blocks many paths between agents, and in the 
most extreme case, can disconnect the network.” (Cowan and Jonard 2007, p. 108) 
  Watts-Strogatz Erdös-Renyi Barabási-Albert Evolutionary 
Path length 4,49 3,45 2,99 2,74 
Cliquishness 0,32 0,03 0,13 0,27 
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To test this hypothesis we conduct in the following section several simulation experiments to 
show to what extend the degree distribution of a network has an effect on the diffusion 
processes and if the explanation by Cowan and Jonard (2007) fully explains the obtained 
differences in the simulation results.  
3.2 Degree distribution and network performance 
In Figure 3, it can be seen that the networks analysed in this paper significantly differ 
concerning the distribution of degrees. The worst performing networks, namely the Barabási-
Albert and the Evolutionary network, are networks that have a highly skewed degree 
distribution following a power law approximately, with a large number of small nodes 
(having only few links) and some big nodes (i.e. stars having a high number of links). Watts-
Strogatz and random networks in contrast, have more symmetric degree distributions with 
only small deviations from the average degree of the network.   
 
Figure 3: Average agents’ degree distribution in the respective networks. 
In figure 4 we analyse how the variance in the degree distribution relates to the resulting 
network performance. Figure 4 reports the findings of this simulation run, measured after 200 
time steps. It can be seen that the higher the variance of the degree distribution of a network, 
the lower the performance of the respective network. The Watts-Strogatz networks, which 
outperform the other networks, are characterized by the lowest variance of nodes’ degrees. 
This relationship between low variance and high network performance also holds true for the 
other networks, e.g. the worst performing networks, Evolutionary networks, are at the same 
time networks with the highest variance of their degree distribution.  
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Figure 4: Relationship between the variance of degree distribution of the respective networks and the mean 
average knowledge levels after 200 time steps. 
However, in contrast to the results of Cowan and Jonard (2007), our results indicate that the 
weak performance of networks with a highly skewed degree distribution cannot (exclusively) 
be explained by Cowan and Jonas “star argument”, according to which the stop of the barter 
trade process (initialized by stars) eventually disconnects the network. We argue that this is 
only a part of the story. Our results indicate that the diffusion of knowledge within scale-free 
networks does stop because of the existence of relatively small, inadequately embedded 
nodes.  
Figure 5 illustrates the cumulative number of agents that stopped trading over time. Not 
surprisingly, in the worst performing networks (i.e. lowest level of knowledge diffusion), i.e. 
the Evolutionary networks, agents stop trading earlier than in the better performing networks 
(i.e. higher level of knowledge diffusion). Comparing Evolutionary and Watts-Strogatz 
networks after 40 time steps shows that in Evolutionary networks almost 90% of the agents 
already stopped trading whereas in Watts-Strogatz networks 65% of all agents are still 
trading. Moreover, in Evolutionary networks almost all agents stopped trading after 70 time 
periods whereas in Watts-Strogatz networks this only happens after 100 time periods.  
To test whether stars block paths between agents because they rapidly acquire all the 
knowledge they need, and so stop trading, we measure the average point in time at which the 
biggest node of a network stops trading. As can be seen in Table 2, our results show, in all 
four networks the stars stop trading not before 70 to 85 percent of the other agents have 
already stopped trading. As we can see in table 2 for the Barabási networks the biggest nodes 
stop trading after 39 steps and for Evolutionary networks stars stop trading after 36 steps. In 
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Evolutionary networks, stars stop trading in a situation in which only 15% of the remaining 
non-stars still trade. In Barabási-Albert networks, stars stop trading in a situation in which 
only 25% of the remaining non-stars still trade. In random networks, stars also stop trading in 
a situation in which only 25% of the remaining non-stars still trade. In Watts-Strogatz 
networks, stars stop trading in a situation in which only 30% of the remaining non-stars still 
trade.  
 
Figure 5: Average cumulative number of non-traders in the respective network topologies over time over 500 
simulation runs. 
 
Table 2: Average point in time the star stops trading depending on the network topology over 500 simulation 
runs.  
Additionally, if we transfer the data from Table 2 to Figure 2 we see that big nodes stop 
trading after the increase in knowledge levels has reached its turning point and almost no 
knowledge is traded within the network anymore. Combined with the result of figure 5, this 
data clearly indicates that the low network performance cannot be exclusively explained by 
stars that stop trading early and disrupt the knowledge flow.   
To stress this idea we show in Figure 6 (left-hand side) the relationship between the number 
of degrees of a node and the time these nodes stop trading. These explorations provide that we 
have to differentiate between three groups of actors. First, very small, inadequately embedded 
agents with a degree smaller than 5 stop trading at the very beginning of the process. Second, 
it can be seen that in all four networks, agents with a degree between 5 and 15 trades longest. 
This means that agents with a medium degree seem to be very important for network 
  Watts-Strogatz Erdös-Renyi Barabási-Albert Evolutionary 
Star stops trading 57,60 51,84 38,88 35,86 
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performance. Third, and this confirms our hypothesis, agents with more than 20 ties stop 
trading after time step 30 to 45, whether or not these agents just have 20 ties or these agents 
are stars with more than 50 ties. 
Finally, figure 6 (right-hand side) shows the relationship between the agents’ degree in the 
different networks and the mean knowledge level these agents reached after 200 periods. The 
figure shows that stars do not have a considerably higher knowledge level than agents from 15 
ties on. Only inadequately imbedded small agents with less than 15 ties have significantly 
lower knowledge endowment than the other agents. This result shows that stars trade over 
longer time periods compared to most other agents. In addition, stars have no significantly 
higher mean knowledge endowment than non-stars and therefore stop trading with other 
agents. This implies that the actual explanation for the worse performance of networks with a 
relatively asymmetric degree distribution is that these networks have a high number of very 
small agents and these very small agents have too little knowledge to continue trading. This, 
in turn, leads to a disruption of the knowledge flow. In other words, it seems not to be the case 
that the high knowledge level of stars causes the lack in double coincidences of wants but 
rather that the very small knowledge level of the small agents does.  
 
Figure 6: Relationship between the time the agents in the network stop trading and their degree (l.h.s.) and the 
relationship between the mean knowledge levels and the degree (r.h.s.). 
Interestingly, these results also occur for networks with higher density. Figure 7 shows that 
even for networks with 100 nodes and 600 links the results explained above hold true 
although in this case small nodes still have a relatively high number of connections (see 
Figure 7). From this we conclude that variance in the degree distribution itself is the limiting 
factor and not the absolute number of links of small nodes. To put it more simple, what 
‘small’ or ‘inadequately embedded’ means depends on the embeddedness of the other actors 
in the network.  
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Figure 7: Relationship between the time the agents in the network stop trading and their degree in a network with 
100 nodes and 600 links (l.h.s.) and the relationship between the mean average knowledge stock and the degree 
in a network with 100 nodes and 600 links (r.h.s.). 
The results we present in this section demonstrate that neither path length nor cliquishness are 
sufficient to explain the knowledge diffusion performance of networks. We need to account 
for other factors such as the degree distribution to fully understand the relevant processes 
within networks. In contrast to the findings of Cowan and Jonard (2007), however, our results 
show that the dissimilarities between nodes, especially for scale free structures, can create 
gaps of knowledge levels. These gaps create a situation where small nodes, as the majority of 
nodes, do not gain knowledge fast enough to keep up to the other nodes in the network. 
Hence, the small agents fall behind and stop trading, disrupting and disconnecting the network 
and the knowledge flow.   
3.3 Policy experiment  
To further investigate the relationship between degree distribution and network performance, 
we implement a policy experiment in the simulation where we analyse the effect of four 
different network modifications. Scenario 1, ‘no intervention’ shows the network performance 
of all four network topologies in a situation where we have no intervention at all, i.e. the 
number of links in the network does not change. This scenario is used as a reference scenario 
for the actual policy intervention. Scenario 2, ‘nonstars’ shows the network performance of 
all four network topologies in a situation where we distributed 20 new links to the 10 agents 
with the smallest degree. Scenario 3, ‘random’ shows the network performance of all four 
networks in a situation where we distributed 20 new links to 10 randomly chosen agents, 
independent of their degree. Scenario 4, ‘stars’ shows the network performance of all four 
networks in a situation where we distributed 20 new links to the 10 agents with the highest 
degree. The results of the policy experiment in terms of its impact on the networks’ 
knowledge level can be seen in figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Average knowledge levels in the respective networks with policy interventions over 500 simulation 
runs.  
For random networks and Watts-Strogatz networks, it can be seen that the increase of the size 
of big nodes actually seems to have a negative impact on network performance as explained 
by the results of Cowan and Jonard (2007). In these networks, the lowest average knowledge 
level can be observed when stars get more links, and the highest average knowledge level can 
be observed when the smallest get more links. However, it has to be kept in mind that, as the 
degree distribution in these networks is relatively symmetric compared to the other networks, 
the ‘stars’ intervention considerably increases the variance of the degree distribution. This is 
not the case in the networks that already have a highly skewed degree distribution with a high 
variance. One important implication is that the worse performance in the ‘stars’ intervention 
is not due to the negative effect of stars but due to the increase in the asymmetry of the degree 
distribution due to an increase in links. This is in line with the fact that in the two highly 
skewed networks, the Barabási-Albert and the Evolutionary network, the intervention ‘stars’ 
has no negative but a positive effect on network performance (as it does not increase the 
already relatively asymmetric degree distribution but only increase the networks density).  
On the other hand, the positive effect of the ‘nonstars’ intervention can be observed in all four 
networks. This means that all four networks benefit from very small agents that get more 
links. As already mentioned before, this is in line with our theory that actually small agents 
with too little knowledge stop trading and so disrupt the network. This leads to the conclusion 
that policy makers must be aware of the complex relationship between degree distribution and 
network performance. In more detail, our results support the idea that policy measures should 
focus on small nodes instead of big nodes. This has to be done to guarantee an efficient 
knowledge flow throughout the network. Therefore, for instance in the case of research 
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funding, always ‘picking-the-winner’ without knowing the exact underlying network structure 
can be harmful.  
4. Discussion and conclusions 
Economic actors – or more technically spoken “agents” - in today’s economies become more 
and more connected and interlinked. Most scholars in the field of interdisciplinary innovation 
research would agree that „networks contribute significantly to the innovative capabilities of 
firms by exposing them to novel sources of ideas, enabling fast access to resources, and 
enhancing the transfer of knowledge“ (Powell and Grodal 2005, p. 79). However, we still face 
the question which network topologies are most effective and efficient in enabling the 
diffusion of knowledge. In this context, it has been frequently argued that small-world 
networks – characterized by short path lengths and high cliquishness – show superior 
knowledge diffusion properties.  
One seminal study in this context is conducted by Cowan and Jonard (2007). They found that 
not only a network’s path length and its cliquishness are important, but also the network’s 
degree distribution seems to be decisive for the diffusion of knowledge through the network. 
Inspired by these interesting insights, we wanted to gain an in-depth understanding of how the 
degree distribution affects knowledge diffusion process. To be more concrete, we used an 
agent-based simulation model to analyse if and how the degree distribution affects the 
diffusion of knowledge that is exchanged in a barter trade exchange process in four 
structurally distinct network topologies.  
Our analysis showed that, in line with the findings of Cowan and Jonard (2007), a highly 
asymmetric degree distribution actually has a negative impact on the overall network 
performance. However, different to Cowan and Jonard (2007), we found that this negative 
effect cannot be explained (solely) by the existence of stars that rapidly acquire knowledge 
and so interrupt the trading process. Our results show that neither do stars acquire more 
knowledge than most of the other agents, nor do they stop trading earlier. Our findings 
indicate that stars trade longer than 70% of the nodes and only stop trading after most of the 
knowledge already has diffused throughout the network. A group of agents that actually has a 
very low level of knowledge and stops trading long before most of the knowledge already 
diffused throughout the network is the group of very small, inadequately embedded agents. 
Notably, our results support the idea that it’s actually the dissimilarity in degree distribution 
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itself. This effect also holds for dense networks and hence, for networks in which small nodes 
still have a high number of links. 
Finally we conducted several policy experiments. The results indicate that in all four networks 
the group which benefited most from an increase in its links is the group of very small agents. 
Our results clearly show that in networks with a skewed degree distribution not the stars 
hinder knowledge diffusion but very small agents do. Summing up, our analyses lead us to the 
conclusion that first, a highly skewed degree distribution negatively influences the diffusion 
of knowledge that is exchanged in a barter trade process. Second, very small agents are the 
bottleneck for the efficient diffusion of knowledge throughout the networks. 
Our work lead us to the following two policy recommendations. First, without knowing the 
exact underlying network structure, it is almost impossible to increase knowledge diffusion 
performance by policy intervention that affects network structures. Our policy experiment 
shows that for some network structures some policy measures can even be harmful. The 
second policy recommendation is that, if the practical relevance of our results could be 
confirmed by further research, policy makers should take care of the dissimilarity of agents’ 
links in informal networks. This would implicate that especially the very small agents have to 
be sufficiently integrated into the network. To confirm our results as well as to get as deeper 
understanding of the explanation of our results, further research, especially on network 
structure’s that evolve over time, has to be done.  
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EARNINGS SHOCKS AND TAX-MOTIVATED INCOME-SHIFTING: 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
 
    ECO 
25-2011 Michael Schuele, 
Stefan Kirn 
QUALITATIVES, RÄUMLICHES SCHLIEßEN ZUR 
KOLLISIONSERKENNUNG UND KOLLISIONSVERMEIDUNG 
AUTONOMER BDI-AGENTEN  
 
ICT 
26-2011 Marcus Müller, 
Guillaume Stern, 
Ansger Jacob and 
Stefan Kirn 
 
VERHALTENSMODELLE FÜR SOFTWAREAGENTEN IM  
PUBLIC GOODS GAME 
 
 
ICT 
27-2011 Monnet Benoit, 
Patrick Gbakoua and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza  
ENGEL CURVES, SPATIAL VARIATION IN PRICES AND 
DEMAND FOR COMMODITIES IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
 
 
ECO 
28-2011 Nadine Riedel, 
Hannah Schildberg-
Hörisch 
 
ASYMMETRIC OBLIGATIONS 
 
 
ECO 
29-2011 Nicole Waidlein 
 
CAUSES OF PERSISTENT PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES IN 
THE WEST GERMAN STATES IN THE PERIOD FROM 1950 TO 
1990 
 
IK 
30-2011 Dominik Hartmann, 
Atilio Arata 
 
MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INNOVATION IN POOR 
AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES. THE CASE OF CHÁPARRA - 
PERU 
 
IK 
31-2011 Peter Spahn DIE WÄHRUNGSKRISENUNION 
DIE EURO-VERSCHULDUNG DER NATIONALSTAATEN ALS 
SCHWACHSTELLE DER EWU 
 
ECO 
32-2011 Fabian Wahl 
 
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES LEBENSSTANDARDS IM DRITTEN 
REICH – EINE GLÜCKSÖKONOMISCHE PERSPEKTIVE 
 
ECO 
33-2011 Giorgio Triulzi, 
Ramon Scholz and 
Andreas Pyka 
 
R&D AND KNOWLEDGE DYNAMICS IN UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
RELATIONSHIPS IN BIOTECH AND PHARMACEUTICALS: AN 
AGENT-BASED MODEL 
IK 
34-2011 Claus D. Müller-
Hengstenberg, 
Stefan Kirn 
 
ANWENDUNG DES ÖFFENTLICHEN VERGABERECHTS AUF 
MODERNE IT SOFTWAREENTWICKLUNGSVERFAHREN 
ICT 
35-2011 Andreas Pyka AVOIDING EVOLUTIONARY INEFFICIENCIES 
IN INNOVATION NETWORKS 
 
IK 
36-2011 David Bell, Steffen 
Otterbach and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
WORK HOURS CONSTRAINTS AND HEALTH 
 
HCM 
37-2011 Lukas Scheffknecht, 
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A BEHAVIORAL MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH  
ENDOGENOUS BOOM-BUST CYCLES AND LEVERAGE 
DYNAMICS 
 
ECO 
38-2011 Yin Krogmann,  
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INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY DURING 
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A DIRECT TEST OF SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING IN 
CONTINGENT VALUATION INTERVIEWS 
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QUANTITATIVE CLUSTERIDENTIFIKATION AUF EBENE 
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VARIETIES OF SERVICE ECONOMIES IN EUROPE        IK 
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INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
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FACHKRÄFTE IN DEN MINT-FÄCHERN 
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INNOVATIONSPOTENTIALE IN BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG: 
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       IK 
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       ECO 
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ORIGINS AND THE DEEP ROOTS OF TRUST 
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STATISTISCHER ÜBERBLICK DER TÜRKISCHEN MIGRATION IN 
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IDENTIFIZIERUNG UND ANALYSE DEUTSCH-TÜRKISCHER 
INNOVATIONSNETZWERKE. ERSTE ERGEBNISSE DES TGIN-
PROJEKTES 
        
IK 
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Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
 
THE ECOLOGICAL PRICE OF GETTING RICH IN A GREEN 
DESERT: A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY IN RURAL 
SOUTHWEST CHINA 
 
        
ECO 
 Nr. Autor Titel CC 
 
56-2012 
 
Matthias Strifler 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS IN LABOR UNION WAGE 
SETTING – A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
        
ECO 
 
57-2012 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
INTEGRATION DURCH WÄHRUNGSUNION? 
DER FALL DER EURO-ZONE 
        
ECO 
 
58-2012 
 
Sibylle H. Lehmann 
 
TAKING FIRMS TO THE STOCK MARKET:  
IPOS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LARGE BANKS IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 1896-1913 
        
ECO 
 
59-2012 Sibylle H. Lehmann, 
Philipp Hauber and 
Alexander Opitz 
 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, TAXATION, AND FIRM VALUATION – 
EVIDENCE FROM SAXONY AROUND 1900 
ECO        
 
60-2012 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
SPECTRAN, A SET OF MATLAB PROGRAMS FOR SPECTRAL 
ANALYSIS 
ECO        
 
61-2012 Theresa Lohse, 
Nadine Riedel 
THE IMPACT OF TRANSFER PRICING REGULATIONS ON 
PROFIT SHIFTING WITHIN EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
ECO        
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62-2013 Heiko Stüber REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY OF NEWLY HIRED WORKERS ECO        
 
63-2013 David E. Bloom, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
AGEING AND PRODUCTIVITY HCM 
 
64-2013 Martyna Marczak, 
Víctor Gómez 
MONTHLY US BUSINESS CYCLE INDICATORS: 
A NEW MULTIVARIATE APPROACH BASED ON A BAND-PASS 
FILTER 
 
ECO 
 
65-2013 Dominik Hartmann, 
Andreas Pyka 
INNOVATION, ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK 
 
66-2013 Christof Ernst, 
Katharina Richter and 
Nadine Riedel 
CORPORATE TAXATION AND THE QUALITY OF RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
ECO 
 
 
67-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, Jiang 
Tong, Luo Jing and 
Sonna Pelz 
 
NONUSE VALUES OF CLIMATE POLICY - AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
IN XINJIANG AND BEIJING 
ECO 
 
68-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Friedrich Schneider 
CONSIDERING HOUSEHOLD SIZE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES 
ECO 
 
69-2013 Fabio Bertoni,  
Tereza Tykvová 
WHICH FORM OF VENTURE CAPITAL IS MOST SUPPORTIVE 
OF INNOVATION? 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN BIOTECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
 
CFRM 
 
70-2013 Tobias Buchmann, 
Andreas Pyka  
THE EVOLUTION OF INNOVATION NETWORKS: 
THE CASE OF A GERMAN AUTOMOTIVE NETWORK 
IK 
 
71-2013 B. Vermeulen, A. 
Pyka, J. A. La Poutré 
and A. G. de Kok  
CAPABILITY-BASED GOVERNANCE PATTERNS OVER THE 
PRODUCT LIFE-CYCLE 
IK 
 
 
72-2013 
 
Beatriz Fabiola López 
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and Alfonso Sousa-
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HOW DOES SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING EVOLVE WITH AGE?  
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
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Wencke Gwozdz, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza, 
Lucia A. Reisch, 
Wolfgang Ahrens, 
Stefaan De Henauw, 
Gabriele Eiben, Juan 
M. Fernández-Alvira, 
Charalampos 
Hadjigeorgiou, Eva 
Kovács, Fabio Lauria, 
Toomas Veidebaum, 
Garrath Williams, 
Karin Bammann 
 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY – 
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
HCM 
 
 
74-2013 
 
Andreas Haas, 
Annette Hofmann  
 
 
RISIKEN AUS CLOUD-COMPUTING-SERVICES: 
FRAGEN DES RISIKOMANAGEMENTS UND ASPEKTE DER 
VERSICHERBARKEIT 
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75-2013 
 
Yin Krogmann, 
Nadine Riedel and 
Ulrich Schwalbe  
 
 
INTER-FIRM R&D NETWORKS IN PHARMACEUTICAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: WHAT DETERMINES FIRM’S 
CENTRALITY-BASED PARTNERING CAPABILITY? 
 
ECO, IK 
 
 
76-2013 
 
Peter Spahn 
 
MACROECONOMIC STABILISATION AND BANK LENDING: 
A SIMPLE WORKHORSE MODEL 
 
ECO 
 
 
77-2013 
 
Sheida Rashidi, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
MIGRATION AND INNOVATION – A SURVEY 
 
IK 
 
 
78-2013 
 
Benjamin Schön, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF TECHNOLOGY-SOURCING 
THROUGH MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS – AN INTUITIVE META-
ANALYSIS 
 
IK 
 
 
79-2013 
 
Irene Prostolupow, 
Andreas Pyka and 
Barbara Heller-Schuh 
 
TURKISH-GERMAN INNOVATION NETWORKS IN THE 
EUROPEAN RESEARCH LANDSCAPE 
 
IK 
 
 
80-2013 
 
Eva Schlenker, 
Kai D. Schmid 
 
CAPITAL INCOME SHARES AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
       ECO 
 
81-2013 Michael Ahlheim, 
Tobias Börger and 
Oliver Frör 
THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNICITY AND CULTURE ON THE 
VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS 
– RESULTS FROM A CVM STUDY IN SOUTHWEST CHINA – 
       ECO 
 
82-2013 
 
Fabian Wahl DOES MEDIEVAL TRADE STILL MATTER? HISTORICAL TRADE 
CENTERS, AGGLOMERATION AND CONTEMPORARY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
       ECO 
 
83-2013 Peter Spahn SUBPRIME AND EURO CRISIS: SHOULD WE BLAME THE 
ECONOMISTS? 
       ECO 
 
84-2013 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE R&D COLLABORATION 
NETWORK 
       IK 
 
85-2013 Athanasios Saitis KARTELLBEKÄMPFUNG UND INTERNE KARTELLSTRUKTUREN: 
EIN NETZWERKTHEORETISCHER ANSATZ 
       IK 
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86-2014 Stefan Kirn, Claus D. 
Müller-Hengstenberg 
INTELLIGENTE (SOFTWARE-)AGENTEN: EINE NEUE 
HERAUSFORDERUNG FÜR DIE GESELLSCHAFT UND UNSER 
RECHTSSYSTEM? 
 
ICT       
 
87-2014 Peng Nie, Alfonso 
Sousa-Poza 
MATERNAL EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDHOOD OBESITY IN 
CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHINA HEALTH AND NUTRITION 
SURVEY 
 
HCM        
 
88-2014 Steffen Otterbach, 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
JOB INSECURITY, EMPLOYABILITY, AND HEALTH: 
AN ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY ACROSS GENERATIONS 
HCM        
 
89-2014 Carsten Burhop, 
Sibylle H. Lehmann-
Hasemeyer 
 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN IMPERIAL 
GERMANY 
ECO        
 
90-2014 Martyna Marczak, 
Tommaso Proietti 
OUTLIER DETECTION IN STRUCTURAL TIME SERIES 
MODELS: THE INDICATOR SATURATION APPROACH 
ECO        
 
91-2014 Sophie Urmetzer, 
Andreas Pyka 
VARIETIES OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED BIOECONOMIES IK        
 
92-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Joongho Lee 
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN FERTILITY AND EDUCATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE KOREAN DEVELOPMENT PATH 
IK        
 
93-2014 Bogang Jun,  
Tai-Yoo Kim 
NON-FINANCIAL HURDLES FOR HUMAN CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION: LANDOWNERSHIP IN KOREA UNDER 
JAPANESE RULE 
 
IK        
 
94-2014 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör, 
Gerhard 
Langenberger and 
Sonna Pelz  
 
CHINESE URBANITES AND THE PRESERVATION OF RARE 
SPECIES IN REMOTE PARTS OF THE COUNTRY – THE 
EXAMPLE OF EAGLEWOOD 
ECO        
 
95-2014 Harold Paredes-
Frigolett, 
Andreas Pyka, 
Javier Pereira and 
Luiz Flávio Autran 
Monteiro Gomes 
 
RANKING THE PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL INNOVATION 
SYSTEMS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND LATIN AMERICA 
FROM A NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
IK        
 
96-2014 Daniel Guffarth, 
Michael J. Barber 
 
NETWORK EVOLUTION, SUCCESS, AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
IK        
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